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To appear in a Festschrift volume for Ivan Berend; not for quotation without permissionThe analytic framework of Center (or Core) and Periphery, interacting in
complementary but unequal ways, has played an important role in the work
of Ivan Berend.
1 This perspective on the world economy and its component
parts has taken on a heightened relevance with the intensification of glob-
alization in the 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet empire and the
formulation of the Washington Consensus. The Center-Periphery approach
is not only useful in understanding the contemporary international econo-
my, but is increasingly employed in economic historiography as well.
The Center-Periphery scheme, implying an enormous asymmetry in the
global economy (and often within regional economies), is identified in the
19th and 20th centuries with the division of the world into a group of indus-
trialized countries around which is arrayed a Periphery of agriculture- and
mineral-exporting countries. Moreover, the notion of economically-differen-
tiated space, with its nodes and fields, is at the heart of the discipline of
economic geography (with its related traditions of central place theory and
its American cousin, regional science).
2 In this essay I will trace the formu-
lation of the Latin American contribution to Center-Periphery analysis, its
diffusion, crisis, reformulation, and decline. I further consider how Center-
Periphery perspectives may be reincorporated into (standard) neoclassical
economics.   
This is a story of multiple, often independent, discoveries. The focus on the
world economy as a site of imperialist expansion for the industrialized coun-
tries of the European Core was developed by Marxists and others, but in
the well-known literature by Hobson, Lenin, Burkharin, Hilferding, and
Luxemburg, the emphasis was almost exclusively on processes occurring
within the industrial and financial metropolis, rather than its imperial or
informal domains. However, one could find writers from peripheral regions
who had more complex interpretations, using a Core-Periphery focus. I have
2
1  E.g., Central and Eastern Europe 1944-1993: Detour from the Periphery to the Periphery
(Cambridge University Press, 1996); The European Periphery and Industrialization 1780-1914
(Cambridge University Press, 1982).
2 The Core-Periphery scheme has its distant roots in The Isolated State (part I, 1826) by the German
economist J. H. von Thunen. I make no claims about direct descent, but von Thunen’s work and
later that of Alfred Weber were the antecedents of central place theory, developed by Walter
Christaller and others in the 1930s.in mind two in Romania, Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea
3  and Mihail
Manoilescu
4, but surely there were others elsewhere.
I. Prebisch and Center-Periphery
Latin American Structuralism, as it came to be known in the 1960s, and its
Center-Periphery framework found a major platform in a United Nations
agency, the Economic Commission for Latin America.This agency, best
known by its Spanish acronym, CEPAL
5, was dominated in its early years
by the ideas, personality, and programs of Raul Prebisch (1901-1986).
Since the agency was so much the creation of Prebisch, we must consider
his early career and formative experiences during the Depression and War
years to learn how the CEPAL theses of 1949 crystallized. Born in the city
of Tucuman in 1901, Prebisch studied at the University of Buenos Aires,
whose Department (Facultad) of Economics at the time was probably the
best school of economic theory in Latin America.
6 Prebisch gave early
promise of a distinguished career within Argentina’s economic establish-
ment. In 1923, upon completing a master’s degree in that discipline, he
was asked to join the faculty at the University. Meanwhile, he was devel-
oping an intimate association with the elite Sociedad Rural (Stockbreeders’
Association). In 1927 he published a Rural-sponsored study that became
the basis for government action on behalf of stockbreeders in the foreign
meat market.
7 Prebisch also played a key role in the creation of Argentina’s
3
3 The Marxist Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea, writing before World War I, foreshadowed post-1945
Center-Periphery thought, Dependency Theory, and modes of production debates in Third World
forums and academies. Gherea presented a Core-Periphery framework for understanding industrial
capitalism and its agrarian dependencies on a world scale; a system-wide historical approach; and
the assertion of the nonviability of a capitalist development in Romania led by local Romanian elites,
at least in the longer run. See Love, Crafting the Third World: Theorizing Underdevelopment in
Rumania and Brazil (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford U. Press, 1996), ch. 3.
4 Manoilescu made a frontal attack on the existing international division of labor, and argued that
labor productivity in “agricultural” countries was intrinsically and measurably inferior to that in
“industrial” countries—so categorized by the composition of their exports. The Romanian did not
hesitate to call agricultural countries “backward,” contending that surplus labor in agriculture in such
nations should be transferred to industrial activities. Unlike Gherea, Manoilescu did not use Center-
Periphery terminology, but he was probably influenced by Ghereaa’s view of international capitalism
(“global” vs. “local” economies). Manoilescu denounced the international division of labor and the
classical theories of trade that recommended to agricultural nations that they continue to channel
their labor force into areas of what he considered inherently inferior productivity. New industries
should be introduced as long as their labor productivity was higher than the national average. See
Love, Crafting, ch. 5.
5 Comision Economica para Anerica Latina.
6 In 1918, Luis Gondra introduced South America’s first course in mathematical economics at the
University of Buenos Aires. Gondra et al., El pensamiento economico latinoamericano (Mexico,
1945), 32.
7 Prebisch’s study offered statistical proof that the meat pool’s interference in the market had been
beneficial for the British packinghouses, but not for the Argentine cattlemen. See Prebisch, “El reg-
imen de pool en el comercio de carnes,” Revista de Ciencias Economicas 15 (Dec., 1927), 1302-
21.Central Bank—with powers to control interest rates and the money sup-
ply—in 1935. From its inception until 1943, Prebisch served as its Director-
General.  
Before the Depression it was considered axiomatic that Argentina had pros-
pered according to the theory of comparative advantage. The benefits of
export-led growth, based on an international division of labor, made com-
parative advantage a near-sacrosant doctrine.
8 The twenties had been a
period of disequilibrium as well as expansion in world trade, and though
Argentina prospered, the country experienced the same problems as other
primary-producing nations in the final years before the October 1929
crash—namely, falling export prices, rising stocks, and debt-payment diffi-
culties. Following Britain’s departure from the gold standard, in October
1931 Argentine authorities introduced exchange controls to try to stem the
outflow of capital and facilitate the repayment of loans negotiated in hard
currencies. The Depression thus brought the abandonment of many hal-
lowed economic doctrines and practices.
In the crisis, Great Britain exploited her single buyer’s position against her
many suppliers. For Argentina, Britain’s trading power was magnified by the
South American nation’s loss of dollar investments. The United States had
become a major supplier of industrial goods to Argentina in the mid-1920s,
but the latter had chronic difficulties in paying directly for U.S. imports with
her own noncomplementary exports. Therefore Argentina had depended on
U.S. capital exports, but during the Depression, North American lenders dis-
invested in Argentina. Excluded from the U.S. market by high tariffs and
other regulations, and cut off from continental markets as well in the early
thirties, Argentina feared above all the loss of British market. Consequently
in 1933 Argentine statesmen and government economists—among them
Raul Prebischh—agreed to accept Britain’s guarantee of a certain level of
meat purchases in exchange for Argentina’s continued debt servicing and
tariff reductions for British manufacturers. After war broke out in 1939, the
British government played its monopsonistic position to yet greater advan-
tage, in negotiations between the Bank of England and Argentina’s Central
Bank, led by Prebisch. One can easily surmise that Argentina’s protracted
and notorious dependence on her major trading partner left a lasting impres-
sion on Prebisch. Furthermore, the Argentine government made great sac-




8 In the words of Carlos Diaz-Alejandro, “From 1860 to 1930 Argentina grew at a rate that has few
parallels in economic history, perhaps comparable only to the performance during the same period
of other countries of recent settlement.” Diaz Alejandro, Essays, 2.
9 Only petroleum-rich Venezuela had retired its foreign debt completely.The Depression not only brought about bilateral negotiations, but a series
of international economic meetings as well. In 1933 Prebisch attended a
gathering of the Preparatory Committee of the Second International
Monetary Conference in Geneva. From Switzerland Prebisch reported to the
government-sponsored Revista Economica that the assembled monetary
experts believed that one basic blockage in the international economic sys-
tem derived from the facts that the United States had replaced Great Britain
as the world’s chief creditor country, and that high American tariff sched-
ules (especially Smoot-Hawley, 1930) did not permit other countries to
repay U.S. loan with exports. Consequently the rest of the world tended to
send gold to the United States, and the bullion was not recirculated in the
international monetary system.
10 
Returning to Argentina after the failure of the World Monetary Conference,
also held in London in 1933, Prebisch sought to understand another vexing
problem wrought by Depression—declining terms of trade. In 1934 he pub-
lished an article pointing out that “agricultural prices have fallen more pro-
foudly than those of manufactured goods,” and that in 1933 Argentina had
to sell 73% more than before the Depression to obtain the same quantity
of (manufactured) imports.
11
Despite the Depression, manufacturing in Argentina grew impressively in
the 1930s and early 1940s, a fact which was recognized by contempo-
raries at home and abroad. In particular, the Central Bank’s Revista
Economica noted an increase in output of 85% (by value) between the
industrial census of 1913 and that of 1934-1935.
12 In its annual report for
1942, the Bank followed through on its changing economic emphases by
championing industrialization. The report, reflecting Prebisch’s views,
argued that exports and industrial development were by no means incom-
patible; rather, the issue was to change the composition of imports from
consumer to capital goods.
13
Prebisch the policymaker interests us less than Prebisch the emerging eco-
nomic theorist. In the latter capacity he was beginning to formulate a the-
ory of unequal exchange. In 1937 the Revista Economica noted that agri-
5
10 Prebisch, “La conferencia economica y la crisis mundial, in [Banco de la Nacion Argentina],
Revista Economica 61, 1 (Jan., 1933), 1, 3. Another reason for U.S. absorption of the world’s gold
supply was the overvaluation of the pound sterling, when Britain returned to the gold standard in
1925.
11 Prebisch, “La inflacion escolastica y la moneda argentina,” Revista de Economia Argentina, ano
17, 193 (July 1934), 11-12; 194 (Aug., 1934), 60.
12 D. M. Phelps, “Industrial Expansion in Temperate South America,” American Economic Review,
25 (1935), 274; Economic Review [Eng. tr. of Revista Economica], series 2, 1, no. 1 (1937), 69.
13 Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, Memoria...1942 (Bs.As., 1943), 30-31.cultural production was inelastic compared to industrial output, and that its
products prices tended to rise and fall faster than industrial prices in the
business cycle. The Revista also noted the related problem of the lack of
organization of agricultural producers, and concluded:
In the last depression these differences manifested themselves in a sharp fall
in agricultural prices and in a much smaller decline in the prices of manufactu-
red articles. The agrarian countries lost part of their purchasing power, with 
the resultant effect on the balance of payments and on the volume of their 
imports.
14
Prebisch emphasized the high elasticity of supply of industrial production,
and implicitly monopoly, and not on wage contracts in the industrial coun-
tries, which were later to be a focal point of his analysis.
Prebisch was also intensely interested in the business cycle in Argentina.
The Central Bank began its effort to conduct countercyclical monetary pol-
icy in 1937, by decreasing the public’s purchasing power through the sale
of bonds in that boom year; in the following period of contraction, it would
attempt to expand purchasing power by lowering the rediscount rate.
15 In
1939, in its annual report for the previous year, Prebisch’s Central Bank
argued that the nation’s business cycles were primarily a reflection of those
of its principal (industrialized) trading partners. It held that Argentina’s inter-
nal credit expansion began with an export surplus, which led to additional
demand for foreign goods, because of exporters’ high propensity to import
luxury goods; when combined with heavy import requirements, the process
repeatedly produced a balance-of-payments crisis in the Argentine business
cycle.
16
In 1943, following the “colonels’ coup” that would soon bring Juan Peron
to power, miliitary leaders dismissed Prebisch from the Bank, apparently
because they associated him with the ranching “oligarchy.” Prebisch now
began to read widely in the recent economic literature.
17 Returning for the
moment to teaching, he prepared a series of lectures in 1944 in which he
referred, for the first time, to “Center” and “Periphery,” terms he would
later make famous.
6
14 Economic Review, series 2, 1, 1 (1937), 26-27.
15 Rafael Olarra Jimenez, Evolucion monetaria argentina (Bs.As., 1968), 13.
16 Banco Central, Memoria...1938 (Bs.As., 1939), 5-8; Prebisch to author, Washington, D.C., 9
Nov. 1977.
17 Interview of Prebisch by author, Washington, D.C., 10 July 1978.Prebisch developed a historical argument, with Britain as the nineteenth-
century Center of the trading and monetary system based on the gold stan-
dard. Under Britain’s leadership as the cycle-generating Center, Prebisch
argued, the world’s economic system had equilibrated gold flows and the
balance of payments over the course of the cycle for both Center and
Periphery. “Gold tended to leave Great Britain, the Center of the system,
and to enter countries of the Periphery in the upswing of the cycle.” Then
it returned in the downswing. A problem for peripheral countries was that
when gold departed in the downswing, “...there was no way to diminish
the gold flow expected by contracting credit... No one could conceive of...
the possibility of raising the rediscount rate in competition with the mone-
tary Center in London.” Thus overall monetary stability was only maintained
at the cost of economic contraction in the Periphery. “The gold standard
was therefore an automatic system for the countries of the Periphery, but
not for the Center,” where the rediscount rate could be adjusted for domes-
tic needs. In the Periphery, the gold standard had the effect of exaggerat-
ing rather than offsetting the cycle.
18
Passing on to the post-World War I years, Prebisch concluded that New
York bankers in the 1920s and 1930s did not have the knowledge or expe-
rience of the “British financial oligarchy,” though of course the world situ-
ation was dramatically different after the War. By 1930 the United States
had sucked up the world’s gold. Consequently, “the rest of the world,
including our country, [is] forced to seek a means of inward-directed devel-
opment (crecer hacia adentro)”
19—a phrase that CEPAL would later make
famous.
The Argentine business cycle, Prebisch continued, had depended on exoge-
nous factors operating through the balance of payments. In the upswing
exports and foreign investment produced an influx of gold and exchange
credits, creating new money and therefore imports. Such changes also
expanded credit to agricultural industries; but because of inelastic supply,
during the downswing, credit was immobilized in the rural sector. Additional
imports were paid for with reserves, producing a monetary crisis.
20
Prebisch’s interest in industrialization as a solution to Latin America’s eco-
nomic problems originally arose from the desire, shared by many other
Argentine contemporaries, to make Argentina less economically “vulnera-
7
18  Prebisch, “La moneda y los ciclos economicos en la Argentina,” [class notes by assistant,
approved by Prebisch], 1944, pp. 61-65, mimeo. Located at the Facultad de Ciencias Economcas,
U. of Buenos Aires.
19 Ibid., 65.
20 Summary of “La moneda” in Olarra Jimenez, Evolucion, 76.ble,” a vulnerability painfully evident for the whole period 1930-1945. As
noted above, the Argentine Central Bank, under Prebisch’s leadership, had
begun to advocate industrialization in its 1942 report. By implication
Prebisch was recommending similar policies to other Latin American gov-
ernments in his Colegio de Mexico lecture in Mexico City of 1944.
21 In his
“Conversations” at the Banco de Mexico (the country’s central bank) in the
same year, Prebisch again noted that the period of greatest industrial devel-
opment in Argentina had been the Great Depression and the times of war,
periods in which the nation had to produce for itself what it could not
import.
22  
In a 1944 article in Mexico’s Trimestre Economico, Prebisch noted that the
United States, unlike Argentina, had a low propensity to import (defined as
the change in the value of imports generated by a given change in the
national product). Since other countries, he implied, had high propensities
to import, and the U.S. had replaced Britain as the chief industrial trading
partner of the Latin American states, he warned that the postwar interna-
tional trading system faced the danger of permanent disequilibrium.
23
Prebisch first used the terminology Center-Periphery in print in 1946, at a
meeting of the hemisphere’s central bankers in Mexico City. He now iden-
tified the United States as the “cyclical Center” and Latin America as the
“Periphery of the economic system.”
24 The emphasis, as indicated, was on
the business cycle, whose rhythms the U.S. economy set for the whole
international system. Fiscal and monetary authorities in the United States
could pursue a policy of full employment without producing monetary insta-
bility, Prebisch argued; furthermore, such authorities did not need to be
especially concerned about the impact of full employment policies on the
exchange rate of the dollar in other currencies. By contrast, Prebisch assert-
ed, the nations of the Periphery could not apply the same monetary tools
as the Center did. Extrapolating from his 1944 argument with reference to
Argentina, Prebisch contended that the money supply in peripheral coun-
tries not be expanded in pursuit of full employment, because, with a high
8
21 Prebisch, “El patron oro y la vulnerabilidad economica de nuestros paises” [a lecture at the Colegio
de Mexico], Revista de Ciencias Economicas, ano 32, serie 2, no.272 (March, 1944), 234; Banco
Central, Memoria...1942, 30.
22 Prebisch, “Analisis de la experiencia monetaria argentina (1935-1943),” in Banco Central, La crea-
cion 1:407. But by the 1970s scholars determined that the period of the 1920s had been one favor-
able to industrial growth.
23 Prebisch, “Observaciones sobre los planes monetarios internacionales,” Trimestre Economico, 11,
2 (July-Sept., 1944), 188, 192-93.
24 The Periphery, of course, was much larger than Latin America, but the latter region was the only
one in 1946 consisting largely of sovereign states, with a newly-created array of central banks. As
for the United States as the Center, in the immediate postwar period it accounted for about half of
the world’s industrial output.propensity to import, any expansion of income would quickly exhaust for-
eign exchange, assuming no devaluation.
This 1946 statement and previous writings of Prebisch implied that periph-
eral countries faced three options, all with undesirable consequences:  they
could have strong currencies and maintain high levels of imports at the cost
of high unemployment; they could fight unemployment with an expansion-
ary monetary policy, but would thereby create inflation and put pressure on
the exchange rate, thus raising the cost of repaying foreign debts; or, if they
used monetary policy to maintain high levels of employment, but failed to
devalue, their reserves would disappear. When prices of the Periphery’s
products fell during the downswing of the cycle, furthermore, governments
of peripheral countries, at least in isolation, could not affect world prices for
their goods as the Center could for its goods. Thus equilibrium theories in
international trade were not acceptable.
25 This was an assault on the poli-
cy prescriptions of neoclassical economics. Prebisch’s message at Mexico
City was in tune with the pessimism then prevailing in Latin America regard-
ing international trade as a long-term engine of growth. Even the improving
terms of trade of the early postwar years was widely viewed as transient.
26
This Center-Periphery framework implied a single system, hegemonically
organized.
27 To appreciate the significance of the concept, we should bear
in mind that the idea that there was something fundamentally different
about the economies of the underdeveloped areas was still novel in the
1940s. The concept of “underdevelopment” as a syndrome was only elab-
orated in that decade, chiefly after the creation of specialized United
Nations agencies in 1947-48. 
The U. N. Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL), which was to
be the principal platform for Prebisch’s theses, resulted from a Chilean ini-
tiative in 1947 at U.N. headquarters in Lake Success, New York. The
agency was approved by the U.N. Economic and Social Council in February
1948, and CEPAL held its first meeting in Santiago, Chile, in June.
Prebisch’s ideas were already familiar to the many Latin American leaders,
through international seminars and his publications. The chief outcome of
9
25 Prebisch, “Panorama general de los problemas de regulacion monetaria y crediticia en el conti-
nente americano: A. America Latina,” in Banco de Mexico, Memoria: Primera reunion de tecnicos
sobre problemas de banca central del continente americano (Mexico, 1946), 25-28;
“Observaciones,” 199.
26 Carlos Diaz Alejandro, “The 1940s in Latin America,” MS, 1982, 39.
27 Though the term “hegemony” did not appear in this early use of Center-Periphery terminology,
Prebisch himself, years later, would specifically employ the word to characterize relations between
the two elements of the world economy. Prebisch, “A Critique of Peripheral Capitalism,” CEPAL
Review, 1st half of 1976, 60.the meeting was a resolution calling for a study of Latin America’s terms of
trade.
28
But without Prebisch’s leadership, CEPAL was not yet CEPAL. The year of
the agency’s founding, 1948, seemed propitious for obtaining Prebisch’s
services: in Peron’s Argentina he was excluded from official posts.
Meanwhile, his reputation as an economist in Latin America had been
enhanced by the publication in Mexico of his Introduccion a Keynes (1947),
the first such primer in Spanish.
Prebisch had turned down an invitation in 1948 to be CEPAL’s first director,
but was invited to go to Santiago to write an introduction to a broad-rang-
ing economic report on Latin America, authorized at the initial CEPAL meet-
ing. In Santiago he elaborated his thesis on the deterioration of the terms of
trade in The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal
Problems, published in Spanish in May 1949.
29 Prebisch had already formed
his opinions about the direction of Latin America’s long-range terms of trade,
since he had argued in the classroom in 1948 that the benefits of techno-
logical progress were absorbed by the Center.
30 Now, a new study, Relative
Prices of Exports and Imports of Underdeveloped Countries, authored by
Hans Singer of the U.N. Department of Economic Affairs, provided an empir-
ical foundation for Prebisch’s thesis. This work was an examination of long-
term trends in relative prices in the goods traded by industrialized and agrar-
ian countries, and concluded that the terms of trade from the late nineteenth
century till the eve of World War II had been moving against the exporters
of agricultural goods and in favor of the exporters of industrial products: “On
the average, a given quantity of primary exports would pay, at the end of
this period, for only 60% of the quantity of manufactured goods which it
could buy at the beginning of the period.”
31
CEPAL explained this finding in part by arguing that gains in productivity
over the period in question were greater in industrial than in primary prod-
ucts, thus challenging basic assumptions of the theory of comparative
advantage. If prices of industrial goods had fallen, this development would
10
28 UN ECOSOC E/CN.12/17 (7 June 1948), 2; E/CN.12/28 (11 June 1948), 6; E/CN.12/71 (24
June 1948).
29 English translation published by United Nations, Lake Success, N.Y., 1950. The original version
lists CEPAL rather than Prebisch as author; later, the organization acknowledged Prebisch’s person-
al authorship.
30 Prebisch, “Apuntes de economia politica (Dinamica economica)” [class notes], 1948, pp. 96-97,
mimeo. Located at the Facultad de Ciencias Economicas, U. of Buenos Aires.
31 United Nations: Dept. of Economic Affairs, Relative Prices of Exports and Imports of Under-
Developed Countries: A Study of Postwar Terms of Trade between Under-Developed and
Industrialised Nations (Lake Success, N.Y., 1949), 7.have spread the effects of technical progress over the entire Center-
Periphery system, and one would expect the terms of trade of agricultural
goods to have improved. They did not do so; and the significance of this
fact had to be understood in terms of business cycles. During the upswing,
the prices of primary goods rise more sharply than those of industrial goods,
but they fall more steeply during the downswing. In the upswing the work-
ing class of the Center absorbs real economic gains, but wages do not fall
proportionately during the downswing. Because workers are poorly organ-
ized in the Periphery (least of all in agriculture),the Periphery absorbs more
of the system’s income contraction than does the Center.
32 Thus in current
parlance, Prebisch focused on the “double factorial terms of trade”—
domestic labor’s compensation vs. that of its foreign counterpart.
In the Economic Survey of Latin America: 1949 (Spanish ed., 1950),
Prebisch expanded on these arguments in an examination of the Latin
American economies from the 1880s onward. He held that there were two
distinct sources of the potential deterioration of the terms of trade, viz.,
those from technological productivity gains in the Center, and those in the
Periphery. He assumed the Center’s gains would be greater, and if the sys-
tem worked normally, these would, to some extent, spread to the
Periphery. In that case, over the long run the Center’s terms of trade would
deteriorate, and the Periphery’s would improve. If the Periphery’s terms
deteriorated, such fact would indicate that it was not only failing to share
in the Center’s presumably larger gains, but was transferring some of its
own productivity gains to the Center.
33 Since Relative Prices had estab-
lished a deterioration in the Periphery’s terms, protection for industry was
a sine qua non to arrest the concentration of the fruits of technological
progress in the Center. 
The basic cause of the deterioration was the surplus labor supply and the
underlying population pressure in the precapitalist, largely agricultural, sec-
tor of the Periphery’s economy. As modern agricultural technique pene-
trates and reduces the size of the precapitalist sector, the Survey stated, a
labor surplus develops. It then adduced historical data to show that the
export sector in Latin America could not absorb this surplus.
Industrialization, in part to absorb the labor surplus, was the centerpiece of
a policy of economic development, the Survey contended.
34
11
32 CEPAL, Economic Development, 8-14. 
33 CEPAL, Economic Survey of Latin America: 1949 (New York, 1951), 47. 
34 Ibid., p. 79.Another initial CEPAL argument grew out of Prebisch’s observations on
Argentina’s import problems in the 1930s. The United States, the principal
cyclical Center, had a much lower import coefficient than export coefficient,
and the former was also much lower than those of the Latin American
countries. The U.S. tended to sell more to Latin America than it bought from
the region, exhausting Latin American reserves, and creating a tendency
toward permanent disequilibrium. Such a tendency had not existed, CEPAL
averred, during the time in which import-hungry Great Britain had been the
principal Center.
35  
But Prebisch and the CEPAL team he organized were also interested in
another dimension of the problem—monopolistic pricing at the Center. The
original analysis in 1949-50 laid much more emphasis on the rigidity of
wages in the downward phase of the cycle than on monopolistic pricing as
such, but the latter argument was there.
36 In any event, both wage rigidi-
ties and monopoly were assumed to be nonexistent in neoclassical trade
theory.  Peripheral countries did not have monopolies on the goods they
offered in the world market, with rare and temporary exceptions, just as
they lacked well-organized rural labor forces that would resist the fall in
wages during the downswing of the cycle. 
The preceding analysis, taken as a whole, pointed to negative features in
the Periphery’s economy: structural unemployment, external disequilibrium,
and deteriorating terms of trade—all of which a properly implemented poli-
cy of industrialization could help eliminate. Industrialization would proceed
by means of import substitution, a process already well underway in the
most advanced regional economies during the interwar period.
In 1950, the year after the appearance of the “CEPAL manifesto,” another
United Nations economist independently made a case related to the CEPAL
theses.  Hans W. Singer, who had directed the U.N. study, Relative Prices—
the data base for CEPAL’s terms-of-trade argument—alleged that techno-
logical progress in manufacturing was shown in a rise in incomes in devel-
oped countries, while that in the production of food and raw materials in
underdeveloped countries was expressed in a fall in prices. He explained the
differential effects of technological progress in terms of different income
elasticities of demand for primary and industrial goods and in terms of the
“absence of pressure of producers for higher incomes” in underdeveloped
countries. Since consumers of manufactured goods in world trade tended
to live in underdeveloped countries, and the contrary was true for con-
12
35 CEPAL, Economic Development, 15-16; CEPAL, Economic Survey 1949, 20, 35-38. 
36 CEPAL, Economic Development, 59. sumers of raw materials, Singer continued, the latter group had the best of
both worlds while the former had the worst.t.
37 This idea was linked to
Prebisch’s, and the two men’s ideas were quickly dubbed the Prebisch-
Singer thesis. 
In fact Prebisch had made two arguments, of which one was better stated
by Singer, and Singer in turn had touched on Prebisch’s theme of contrast-
ing degrees of labor organization in Center and Periphery. The latter’s cen-
tral argument related to differential productivities in Center and Periphery.
His other argument dealing with disparities in import coefficients was
roughly analogous to Singer’s more elegant argument on differential income
elasticities, and CEPAL soon adopted Singer’s terms. Yet  Singer saw the
phenomenon caused by contrasting elasticities of demand for agricultural
and industrial goods in the world markets, while Prebisch viewed the root
of the problem as that of factor markets—labor and capital. In this regard,
he was the forerunner of Samir Amin and Arghiri Emmanuel.
38
II. Sources for Prebisch’s doctrine
Such were the main lines of Prebisch’s and CEPAL’s early development. It
seems useful to digress briefly on the theoretical sources on which Prebisch
drew. If these were not genetically related, comparing such propositions
and theories with CEPAL’s will serve to highlight the distinctive features of
the CEPAL argument. 
One obvious possibility is the work of Alejandro Bunge, Argentina’s leading
advocate of industrialization in the 1920s, and Prebisch’s former teacher at
the University of Buenos Aires. Like the classical mercantilists, Bunge
defended industrialization not in theoretical but in policy terms, and saw it
as a means of reducing imports to relieve pressure on the balance of pay-
ments; yet he viewed industrialization as a complement to export-driven
growth more than a substitute for it.
39 All the same, Bunge, whose views
were influenced by his studies in Wilhelmine Germany, argued that the glob-
al economy was led by what he called the astro (star) states, clearly a ref-
13
37  H[ans] W. Singer, “The Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing Countries,”
American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 40, 2 (May 1950), 473-85 (quotation on 479).
Income elasticity of demand for a good refers to the relative response of demand to a small per-
centage change in income,  q/q/  y/y, where q is the quantity demanded, and y is disposable income).
38 Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange: A Study in the Imperialism of Trade, tr. by Brian Pearce
(New York, Monthly Review, 1972); Samin Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the
Theory of Underdevelopment, tr. by Brian Pearce (New York: Monthly Review, 1974).
39 Alejandro E. Bunge, La economia argentina (Bs. As.), 2 (1928), 229-31; 4 (1930), 131; Tulio
Halperin Donghi, “Argentina: ensayo de interpretacion,” in Roberto Cortes Conde and Stanley J.
Stein, eds., Latin America: A Guide to Economic History, 1830-1930 (Berkeley, 1977), 67, 115. erence to an implicit Center-Periphery vision of the world economy, but
without a theory of interaction of the two parts.
Another possible source for Prebisch is Werner Sombart, the maverick of the
last generation of the German Historical School. Sombart’s Der moderne
Kapitalismus was probably the first work to distinguish between Center and
Periphery in the world economic system. Specifically, Sombart wrote:
We must...distinguish a capitalist Center—the central capitalist nations—from
a mass of peripheral countries viewed from that Center; the former are active
and directing, the latter, passive and serving. England constituted the capital-
ist Center in the first half of the nineteenth century; later, in the longer period
of High Capitalism, Western Europe [joined England]....Finally, in the last gene-
ration, the eastern part of the United States has moved up [to the Center].
40
Sombart also wrote of the “dependence” of peripheral countries, and even
of the servitude of the peasantry of the Periphery, in part caused by west-
ern European capitalism.
41 But, like Bunge, Sombart did not provide any
theory of relations between Center and Periphery; in particular, he offered
no analysis of the relation between business cycles and the international
distribution of income. Years later, Prebisch did not recollect an acquain-
tance with Sombart’s passage at the time of his initial use of the terms
Center and Periphery,
42 but even assuming he was inspired by Sombart,
Prebisch would owe little more than an arresting notion, since Sombart only
used Center and Periphery in a few scattered paragraphs.
43 In any event,
the international financial (as opposed to economic) system was already
being described in Center-Periphery terms by 1940, and Prebisch extended
the terms from gold flows to movements in the whole international econo-
my, in the manner of Sombart.
44
14
40 Werner Sombart, Der moderne Kapitalismus (Munchen, 1928), III [2 vols. bound as 1], vol. 1, pp.
xiv-xv. A Spanish version was published in Mexico in 1946.
41 Ibid., p. 64; vol. 2, p. 1019. 
42 Prebisch to author, Washington, D.C., 26 June 1979. 
43 In 1977 Prebisch did not recall how he came to use the terms Center and Periphery.  Prebisch to
author, 29 June 1977.
44 William A. Brown, Jr., an American economist, used the terms Center and Periphery in 1940 with
respect to the international gold standard: “The Center countries, by the very fact of their domina-
tion of the world, can never shift to the Periphery, and the Periphery countries have to consider the
sum total of their relations to this central system of [exchange] rates in determining their currency
policy.” The terms do not figure in a cyclical theory, but Brown’s work was in an area in which
Prebisch was reading in the early 1940s. See Brown, The International Gold Standard Reinterpreted:
1914-1934 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1940), vol 2, p. 862.More plausible as a direct theoretical influence than the writings of Bunge
or Sombart is the work of the aforementioned Romanian, Mihail
Manoilescu
45 who in turn was well acquainted with the Center-Periphery
scheme of his fellow Romanian, Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea.
46 The
Canadian-American trade theorist Jacob Viner linked the theses of
Manoilescu with those of Prebisch as early as 1950.
47 During the thirties
and forties, Manoilescu was in fact well known in certain parts of the
Iberian world: Several of his economic and political essays had been pub-
lished in those years in Spain, Portugal, Brazil, and Chile. In Prebisch’s own
Argentina, Manoilescu seems to have had less influence than in Chile and
Brazi1. Clearly, there were broad similarities between the two theories of
unequal exchange which converged in the same policy prescription of
industrialization, though the Center-Periphery framework was only implicit
in the Romanian’s work. It is notable that Prebisch’s focus on productivities
within Center and Periphery paralleled Manoilescu’s, and both writers
shared a common theoretical perspective:  the separation of the critique of
imperialism from that of capitalism.  Yet there were crucial differences:   the
Argentinean believed that primary commodities’ prices would continually
fall relative to those for industrial goods over the long term, while
Manoilescu believed the effect was instantaneous.
48 Furthermore,
Manoilescu’s emphasis on capital-to-worker ratios and his assumption of
static costs and prices implied a static technology. By contrast, Prebisch,
other Structuralists, and Dependency writers subsequently placed techno-
logical change at the heart of their analysis of differential productivities.
49
For Prebisch these differences in productivities of the industrial Center and
the agricultural Periphery, combined with product and labor monopolies in
the former, were the root causes of the long-term deterioration of com-
modity terms of trade. Thus, he seems not to have been directly influenced
by Manoilescu, and there are no references to the Romanian economist’s
works in Prebisch’s early writings. In 1977 he confirmed the absence of
such an influence, though he was probably familiar with Manoilescu from
the brief discussions the latter’s ideas received in the Argentine Revista de
Ciencias Economicas in the late thirties.
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45 See footnote 5, above.
46 See footnote 4, above.
47 Jacob Viner, International Trade and Economic Development (Glencoe, Ill., 1952) [lectures deliv-
ered in 1950], 61-64. Over the next twenty years, others in Latin America, the United States, and
Romania would concur in Viner’s judgment.
48  See Love, Crafting the Third World: Theorizing Underdevelopment in Rumania and Brazil
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford U. Press, 1996), pp. 134-136.
49 See, for example, Jorge Katz, ed., Technology Generation in Latin American Manufacturing
Industries: Theory and Case Studies Concerning its Nature, Magnitude, and Consequences
(Houndmills, Eng., 1987).A distinguished neoclassical economist with whose work probably affected
Prebisch’s thinking was the Swede Gustav Cassel. In a study for the League
of Nations in 1927, Cassel pointed to monopolistic tendencies in the labor
and manufactures markets of the industrial West. “From 1913, a very seri-
ous dislocation of relative prices has taken place in the exchange of goods
between Europe and the colonial world...” owing to these monopolies, he
wrote.
50 These causes of high and downwardly-rigid industrial prices were
to be cited by later writers in the interwar years, including Manoilescu.
Prebisch was almost certainly familiar with this literature.
In fact, Prebisch’s sources of inspiration were eclectic, as shown by his
debt to the American trade theorist Charles Kindleberger. In 1943
Kindleberger had published two articles calling for the industrialization of
agricultural and raw material producers on the basis of long-term deteriora-
tion of the terms of trade, and Prebisch was familiar with at least one of
them.
51 In “International Monetary Stabilization,” Kindleberger argued that
the terms of trade moved against agricultural products” because of the
institutional organization of production” in industry, a reference to internal
and external economies and possibly to monopoly elements, and also
because of differences in the elasticity of demand for agricultural and indus-
trial products.
52 Kindleberger pointed out that an agricultural country’s
increased productivity in primary activities under these conditions could
only raise real income if the labor freed from agriculture were permitted to
emigrate or found employment in industry.
53 Otherwise, the terms of trade
would move against the country, and it would have realized no benefit from
the increased output of primary goods.  
Looking ahead to the postwar era, Kindleberger foresaw disequilibria in the
international trading system. A specific instance was the case of two coun-
tries with differing marginal propensities to import. For the country heavily
dependent on exports and having a high propensity to import, a rise in
exports could eventually produce an unfavorable balance of trade. “It may
be suggested that the United States has a comparatively low propensity to
16
50 Cassel put the larger share of blame on trade union monopolies rather than on “monopolistic com-
bines of enterprises,” but argued that the two were mutually reinforcing. Cassel, Tendencies in
Industry and Trade:  Being an Analysis of the Nature and Causes of the Poverty of Nations (Geneva:
League of Nations, 1927), pp. 29, 43-44.
51 Kindleberger, “Planning for Foreign Investment,” American Economic Review, 33, 1 (Mar., 1943),
Supplement, 347-354; and “International Monetary Stabilization” in Seymour E. Harris, ed., Postwar
Economic Problems (London, 1943), 375-395. Prebisch cited the latter article in “Observaciones
sobre los planes monetarios internacionales,” Trimestre Economico, 11, 2 (July-Sept., 1944), 195-
196, though he did so in order to contest the American’s references to the behavior of the Argentine
economy.  
52 Kindleberger, “International Monetary Stabilization,” 378.
53 Ibid., p. 377, citing Colin Clark, The Economics of 1960 (1942). import and a low ratio of exports to national income, whereas the rest of
the world has a relatively high elasticity of demand for United States
exports of manufactured goods and a relatively high ratio of exports to
income.”
54 One may infer the external imbalance was, potentially at least,
a structural problem. In fact, at Prebisch’s seminar on central banking in
Mexico in 1944, he cited Kindleberger’s thesis that the U. S. would have a
persistent trade imbalance with the rest of the world because of disparities
in demand elasticities.
55 Kindleberger’s contribution to Prebisch’s original
Structuralism thus seems large, though Kindleberger did not use Center-
Periphery language.
Finally, Prebisch was a careful student of John Maynard Keynes’s General
Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936), and wrote the afore-
mentioned primer on Keynes. Like the British theorist, Prebisch viewed gov-
ernment intervention in the economy as necessary to correct market fail-
ures, and he believed that Keynes’s fiscal and monetary policies to achieve
full employment were appropriate for the Center, but not the Periphery.
56
In any case, CEPAL’s theses, from their initial appearance in 1949, were
hotly contested by neoclassical trade theorists, such as Viner. In particular,
the terms-of-trade thesis came under severe attack, as the validity of the
data was challenged on a variety of grounds.
57
III. Diffusing the doctrine:
Through CEPAL, its seminars, courses, and publications in Santiago and
other cities of Latin America, as well as the activities of CEPAL economists
in national finance ministries, Prebisch projected  his views on Center-
Periphery relations throughout the region in the 1950s and early 1960s.  He
17
54 Ibid., 381. The writer was referring both to income- and price-elasticity (p. 380).
55 Prebisch in Banco Central, La creacion, I, 530-531.
56 The relationship between Prebisch’s Center-Periphery model and the structuralist theses of Ernst
Wagemann and Francois Perroux is considered and rejected in Love, Crafting, pp. 112, 134..
57 The principal arguments and sources in this long debate have been summarized and evaluated by
John Spraos, who concludes that Prebisch was right about long-term deterioration of net barter
terms of trade for 1870-1939, but that the trend was weaker than Prebisch thought. Furthermore,
for 1900-1975, Spraos concludes the data were trendless. Yet Prebisch would still argue, one
assumes, that anything less than a favorable trend for primary products would show that the Center
was benefitting more than the Periphery in the trading process (assuming greater technological pro-
ductivity gains in the Center). See Spraos, “The Statistical Debate on the Net Barter Terms of Trade
between Primary Commodities and Manufactures,” Economic Journal, 90 (March, 1980), 107-28,
esp. 126. More recent studies of long-term data have tended to support Prebisch and Singer.  For
an extensive review of the literature, generally supporting Spraos’s findings, see Dimitris
Diakosavvas and Pasquale L. Scandizzo, “Trends in the Terms of Trade of Primary Commodities,
1900-1982: The Controversy and Its Origins,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 39, 2
(Jan., 1991), 237 (on Spraos).did so on a world stage from 1964 to 1969, as the first Secretary General
of UNCTAD, the U. N. Conference on Trade and Development. A perma-
nent structure to deal with trade issues was approved at the first meeting
of UNCTAD. Prebisch and Wladyslaw Malinowski, a U. N. official from
Poland, were most responsible for establishing UNCTAD as a permanent
U.N. organization, rather than a one-off conference.
58 This organization, in
Prebisch’s view, was to be “activist, not policy-neutral.”
59 
Prebisch’s reports at the first two Conferences (1964, 1968) reflected
CEPAL’s analysis of world trade. Prebisch’s reports to UNCTAD, if not
cepalismo whole cloth, mainly consisted of global adaptations of the region-
al agency’s program as it had evolved by the early 1960s. First of all, the
world was divided into “Centers” and “Peripheries.”
60 Secondly, the secu-
lar deterioration of the terms of trade of agriculture and mineral exporters
was affirmed as a fact, presumably to the displeasure of First World repre-
sentatives, who doubted or denied the existence of secular deterioration.
61 
Following UNCTAD’s first conference in 1964, Prebisch was optimistic
about the prospects of the new organization, reiterating his view that the
underdeveloped countries could close the “trade gap” through future indus-
trial exports. Perhaps the greatest reason for optimism, thought Prebisch,
was the constitution of a new force within the Third World contingent in
UNCTAD, namely, the “Group of 75,” which by the end of the first meet-
ing at Geneva had become the “Group of 77.”
62 This political alliance, he
believed, could exercise real pressure in pursuit of its members’ interests in
the years to come. In fact, the G77 soon became a permanent entity, and
over time it organized chapters in other international organizations.
63
18
58 Raúl Prebisch, interview by David Pollock, Washington, D.C., 21-23 May 1985, MS (courtesy of
David Pollock).  Zenon Carnapas credits Prebisch and Malinowski jointly with making UNCTAD a per-
manent entity of the U.N.  See Carnapas, “Wladyslaw R. Malinowski (1909-1975)” in Michael
Zammit Cutajar, UNCTAD and the South-North Dialogue: The First Twenty Years (Oxford, UK:
Pergamon, 1985), p. xiii.
59 Edgar J. Dosman and David H. Pollock, “Hasta la UNCTAD y de regreso: divulgando el evange-
lio. 1964-1968” in Estudios Sociologicos del Colegio de Mexico, 14, 48 (September- December
1998), pp. 573- 603. 
60 Raúl Prebisch, “Towards a New Trade Policy for Development” (New York:  UNCTAD, 1964),
pp. 20-26; Prebisch, “Toward a Global Strategy of Development,” UNCTAD, Second Conference
(1968), pp. 27-28.
61 Prebisch., “Towards a New Trade Policy,” pp. 14-17. On the long debate about the validity of
the deterioration thesis, see notes 57 and 81. 
62 Prebisch, “Towards a New Trade Policy,” p. 15.
63 By the late 1960s, the G77 had developed a continuing institutional structure, which in turn devel-
oped chapters of the Group of 77 in the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) in Rome, the
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in Vienna, UNESCO in Paris, the United
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) in Nairobi, and the Group of 24 in the IMF and World Bank.Encouraged by what seemed to be a strong showing of Third World unity
and determination, Prebisch became an itinerant preacher to spread the
UNCTAD evangel. He took his message on unequal exchange between
Center and Periphery to Africa and Asia, as well as to Latin America.
Between 1964 and 1969 he logged 600,000 miles giving speeches and
meeting heads of government and their ministers. On the force of his ideas
and personality, Prebisch attempted to strengthen and expand the Group of
77 as an effective voice on trade and development. In this he succeeded,
in that the considerable majority of the G77 nations supported Prebisch’s
Generalized System of Preferences; by this protocol, later approved by
UNCTAD as a whole, the industrialized nations would suspend the most-
favored-nation provisions of GATT in order to lower tariffs on new indus-
trial exports from the countries of the South.
Beyond UNCTAD, Prebisch played the leading role not only in founding the
G77, but in initiating the process that would result in the “Declaration on
the Establishment of a New International Economic Order” (NIEO) by the U.
N. General Assembly in 1974.
64 The statement consisted of twenty broad-
ly-stated demands, mostly derived from previous UNCTAD policy state-
ments, but often radicalized. These included “sustained improvement in the
terms of trade for primary products”; favorable terms for obtaining financial
transfers for Third World nations; a reform of the international monetary
system; increased preferential treatment for less-developed countries in
trade agreements; and regulation of multi-national corporations by all states
which claimed “sovereign equality.”
65
IV: Structuralism’s Crisis and Transformation into Dependency
Yet already by the 1960s the Structuralist analysis was in crisis on its home
ground, Latin America. The decline began with CEPAL´s own doubts, in the
latter 1950s, when the institution noted that industrialization through
import substitution, the centerpiece of CEPAL’s development policy, was
not working as the agency had anticipated.
66 The import requirements of
industrialization in the more advanced regional economies expanded more
rapidly than national output, thus making them more, rather than less,
dependent on international markets. Furthermore, in the 1960s growth was
fitful, and national markets seemed to hit “demand ceilings” for durable
19
64 That the NIEO movement began with Prebisch’s efforts at UNCTAD is confirmed in standard eco-
nomics textbooks on development and in a history of development theory—e.g., Michael P. Todaro,
Economic Development in the Third World, 3rd ed. (New York, 1985), p. 560; H[einz] W. Arndt,
Economic Development: The History of an Idea (Chicago, 1987), p. 141.
65 Arndt, p. 142.
66 CEPAL took first note of the problem in Argentina as early as 1956. See CEPAL, “Preliminary
Study of the Effects of Postwar Industrialisation on Import Structures and External Vulnerability in
Latin America,” in Economic Survey of Latin America 1956 (New York, 1957), 128, 150, 151.goods, owing in part to the inequality in income distribution, as
Structuralists saw it.
Another problem of industrialization was its failure to offer a sufficient num-
bers of jobs, as both population growth and rates of rural-urban migration
in Latin America hit record rates around 1960, a situation that vastly
expanded the employment problem. Sluggish and even negative growth in
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in the 1960s contributed to coups d’état coups
in Argentina and Brazil in the 1960s, and in Chile in 1973. In the first two
countries military dictatorships would extend into the 1980s, and in Chile,
into the 1990s
67. These regimes turned to orthodox, “monetarist” policies,
and explicitly or implicitly rejected Structuralism. Related developments,
including the United States’ greater friendliness toward military regimes
under Presidents Johnson and Nixon, helped bring about a reassessment of
Structuralism that in turn led to Dependency Theory. 
The essential elements of Dependency were 1) a characterization of mod-
ern capitalism as a Center-Periphery-relationship between the developed,
industrial West and the underdeveloped, technologically backward Third
World; 2) the adoption of a system-wide historical approach, and the con-
sequent rejection of Boekean dualism and Parsonian modernization theory;
3) the hypothesis of unequal exchange, as well as asymmetrical power rela-
tions between Center and Periphery; and 4) the assertion of the relative or
absolute nonviability of a capitalist path to development, based on the lead-
ership of the national bourgeoisies of the Latin American nations.
Of the numerous contributors to Dependency (including Prebisch himself),
of special note is the Brazilian Structuralist Celso Furtado, who, though a
decade younger than Prebisch, had joined CEPAL shortly before the
Argentine economist. Furtado’s critical contribution was moving
Structuralism from a cyclical analysis to a fully historical perspective,
68
along with linking development and underdevelopment as interrelated
processes. He introduced these two departures from the original
Structuralist analysis in 1959, and developed them in the following
decade.
69 Determining where Structuralism ends and Dependency begins is
something of an arbitrary process, but Furtado and other CEPAL
Structuralist economists who embraced Dependency Theory did not frame
their work in a Marxist paradigm. 
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67 Although Pinochet quit the presidency of Chile in 1990, he remained commander-in-chief of the
armed forces until 1998.
68 See Furtado, Formacao economica do Brasil (Rio, 1959). A structuralist history of Chile was pub-
lished in the same year by Anibal Pinto.
69 See Love, Crafting, pp. 170-171. Other Dependency-influenced writers associated with CEPAL, especially the
Brazilian sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso and the Chilean economist
Osvaldo Sunkel, further developed the Dependency perspective. Cardoso,
the future president of Brazil, set it in a Marxist framework.
70 But for the
Anglophone world in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Dependency was rad-
icalized and popularized most effectively by Andre Gunder Frank. He too
was participating in the seminars in Santiago, the crucible of Dependency
Theory, just as it had been of Latin American Structuralism. Frank’s arrest-
ing phrases, “development of underdevelopment,” “lumpenbourgeoisie,
lumpendevelopment,” and “metropolis and. satellite”—his version of Center
and Periphery—made for a lively read. Furthermore, his conviction that
underdevelopment deepened as time advanced made him an enthusiastic
supporter of the Cuban Revolution. Like other Dependency writers, includ-
ing Johan Galtung, who was in Santiago in the 1960s,
71 Frank saw capi-
talism developing in historical stages, and in his view each stage was based
on period-specific forms of monopoly.
Frank and Furtado were two authors who were frequently cited by
Immanuel Wallerstein in his two celebrated studies appearing in 1974, con-
cerning what he called the Modern World System.
72 In Wallerstein’s
Dependency-suffused scheme,
73 unlike the Latin American variety, the
focus was on the Center (for Wallerstein, the Core). In Britain the econo-
mist Dudley Seers and others applied a Core-Periphery approach in
Underdeveloped Europe in 1979,
74 after his earlier association with CEPAL.
Three years later, Ivan Berend and Gyorgy Ranki, his fellow economic his-
21
70  Cardoso, based in the mid-1960s at the Latin American Institute for Economic and Social
Planning, a dependency of CEPAL, did explicitly employ a Marxist paradigm, as did many other
dependency writers of the 1960s and 1970s. Elsewhere I have tried to show that the main source
of Cardoso’s Dependency and Development, jointly authored with Enzo Faletto, was Latin American
structuralism, not Marxism. See Love, Crafting the Third World, p. 195, and Cardoso and Faletto,
Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina (México, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno, 1969).
71 Galtung was in Santiago in 1962-63, and maintained contact with Santiago-based personnel later.
His model of imperialism cites the dependency literature, and Sunkel criticized the essay in manu-
script. See Johan Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism,” Journal of Peace Research, no. 2
(1971), 81-117.
72 Wallerstein, “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System,” Comparative Studies
in Society and History, 16, 4 (Sept., 1974), 387-415; Wallerstein, The Modern World System, I
(New York: Academic Press, 1974).
73 In turn, Wallerstein was heavily influenced by Dependency Theory. Daniel Chirot and Thomas D.
Hall remark, with some exaggeration, that Wallerstein’s World System Theory “is in most ways
merely a North American adaptation of dependency theory....” Chirot and Hall, “World-System
Theory,” in Annual Review of Sociology, 8 (1982), p. 90.
74 D. Seers, B. Schafer, and M. L. Kiljunen, Underdeveloped Europe:  Studies in Core-Periphery
Relations (Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press, 1979). Seers’ debt to CEPAL is evident from
his article, “Los estudios sobre el desarrollo en Europa occidental,” in José Molero, ed., El análisis
estructural en economía: Ensayos de América Latina y España (México, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura
Económica [Lecturas 40], 1981), pp. 200-207.torian, took a long-term view of Core-Periphery relations in Europe, having
borrowed the terms from Wallerstein.
75  
The impact of  Latin American Structuralism and Dependency on develop-
ment theory in Peripheral Europe is the subject of recent essays of mine,
dealing with Spain, Portugal, and Romania.
76 Structuralism’s influence in
these countries was strongest in the 1950s, and Dependency in the 1970s,
as they were elsewhere. Yet in the latter decade it is difficult to separate
them, as is indicated in a tribute to Prebisch by the Egyptian economist
Samin Amin, in Accumulation on a World Scale (1974):   
There can be no doubt that the first edition [of this work] did not do justice to
the debt I owe, along with all concerned with nonapologetic study of underde
velopment, to the Latin American writers on the subject.  Raul Prebsich took 
the lead in this field, and I have shown in this book that the theory of unequal
of exchange was founded by him, even if the conjunctural context in which he
set it, in his first version, has lost its significance.  It is also to the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, of which he was the moving
spirit, that I owe the essence of the critical theory to which I adhere…
77
V. The Broader Crisis in Development Economics and its Potential
Resolution
Although Dependency Theory gained traction in the early 1970s among
First World political scientists and sociologists, it had far less impact on neo-
classical economists. Structuralism, by contrast, was at least “respectable”
enough to be widely discussed, if often vigorously opposed, by Western
economists. But Latin American Structuralism was one version of a broad-
er class of early development theories—what Paul Krugman calls High
Development Theory—that assumed that rapid economic development
could occur in Third World countries by taking advantage of increasing
returns, based on expanding markets and internal and external economies
of scale. By the late 1960s, however, the economics profession was
demanding greater standards of formalization and rigor. Since increasing
returns implied imperfect competition, the problem was that no one had
22
75  Ivan Berend and Gyorgy Ranki, The European Periphery and Industrialization: 1780-1914
(Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge U. Press, 1982), p. 8.  
76 Love, “Structuralism and Dependency in Peripheral Europe: Latin American Ideas in Spain and
Portugal,” Latin American Research Review, 39, 2 (June, 2004), pp. 114-139; Love, “Flux and
Reflux: Interwar and Postwar Structuralist Theories of Development in Romania and Latin America.”
in Helga Schultz and Eduard Kubu, eds., History and Culture of Economic Nationalism in East Central
Europe (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2006) pp. 71-86.
77 Amin, Accumulation, pp. 609-610.succeeded in modeling this form of market organization. In Krugmann’s
words, “The result was that development economics as a distinctive field
was crowded out of the mainstream of economics. Indeed, the ideas of
‘high development theory’ came to seem not so much wrong as incompre-
hensible,”
78 because it couldn’t be mathematically modeled. The same
problem occurred with economic geography, which also assumed increas-
ing returns.
Before 1990, the standard explanation of economic growth was that of
Robert Solow, whose independent variables included only labor and capital.
Yet in empirical regressions the two together “explained” less than half of
measured growth, leaving technology in a black box (the “residual”). In
recent years, however, the theoretical problem appears to have been
solved, chiefly through the work of Paul Romer. His model of economic
growth, published in 1990, incorporated technology (and therefore new
knowledge), rather than seeing it as exogenous.
79 Romer showed how
bringing in technology could explain the widely-observed phenomenon of
increasing returns, contrary to the standard assumption of constant returns,
used by Solow. This was the case because technology raises total output
through positive externalities without any obvious limits. The Romer expla-
nation potentially offers the necessary theoretical foundation to reincorpo-
rate economic geography, with its spatial and structural differentiation, into
mainstream economics. Hence, Center-Periphery models might aspire to a
legitimate status in standard economic theory. Romer also resolved a prob-
lem for which Raul Prebisch could only assume a solution: That technolog-
ical progress was the chief element in raising productivity in modern capi-
talism.
Meanwhile, for a number of reasons, as wide-ranging as the perceived fail-
ures of import-substitution industrialization in the 1960s to the collapse of
the Soviet empire and the USSR itself in 1989-91, Structuralism had lost
its appeal in Latin America and elsewhere.
80 On the defensive, CEPAL
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78 Paul Krugman, “Toward a Counter-Counter Revolution in Development Theory,” World Bank
Annual Conference on Development Economics: 1992 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1992),
abstract. A more widely-available version of this argument is found in his Development, Geography,
and Economic Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), ch. 1. 
79 Paul M. Romer, “Endogenous Technological Change,” Journal of Political Economy, 98, 5, part
2, pp. S71-102. Also see Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer. and Robert Vishny, “Industrialization
and the Big Push,” J. of Political Economy, 97, 1003-1026. For a discussion of the significance of
Romer’s article, see David Warsh, Knowledge and the Wealth of Nations: A Story of Economic
Discovery (New York: Norton, 2006).
80 For a fuller exploration of the decline of Latin American structuralism, see Love, “The Rise and
Decline of Economic Structuralism in Latin America: New Dimensions,” Latin American Research
Review, 40, 3 (Oct., 2005), pp. 100-125.retained its decades-old interest in the relationship between growth and
equity in Latin American societies, but it quietly abandoned its signature
Center-Periphery framework in 1990, the same year that Romer’s landmark
paper seemed to make such a perspective potentially “respectable.”
81 In
any event, the Harvard economist and historian Jeffrey Williamson and his
numerous collaborators use a Core-Periphery framework in studying the
world economy; otherwise, they employ the standard tool kit of neoclassi-
cal economics.
82 It seems that geography and history (the timing and inten-
sity of change) matter, even in economics.
VI. Conclusion
In this essay we have considered the Latin American contribution to Center-
Periphery analysis by tracing the origins and development of Latin American
Structuralism. Prebisch’s theorizing began in the orthodoxy of pre-
Depression central banking, but was transformed as the Depression persist-
ed. His ideas were eclectic, and he owed something to Keynesianism, neo-
classical trade theory, and more remotely to the German Historical School.
The Prebisch-Singer thesis on deteriorating terms of trade was both simple
and persuasive in Latin American and Third World milieux.  Its impact owed
not only to its relative simplicity and its apparent empirical verification, but
also to Prebisch’s platforms in the United Nations—CEPAL and then UNC-
TAD, as well as to his skills as an international bureaucrat and diplomat.
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1990s (Santiago, Chile: United Nations: CEPAL, 1990); and the report a decade later by CEPAL´s
Executive Secretary, Jose Antonio Ocampo: Equidad, desarrollo y ciudadania (Santiago:  CEPAL,
2000).
Nonetheless, the Director of CEPAL continued to defend the thesis of long-term deteriorating
terms of trade for agricultural goods and raw materials in the world market. See Jose Antonio
Ocampo and Maria Angela Parra, “Returning to an eternal debate:  The terms of trade for com-
modities in the twentieth century,” CEPAL, series Informes y Estudios Especiales, no. 5, Feb., 2003,
56 pp. [http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/SecretariaEjecutiva/3/LCL1813PI/lcl1813i.pdf]. 
Christopher Blattman, Jason Hwang and Jeffrey Williamson argue, on the basis of an analysis of
35 countries for 1870-1939, that although terms of trade movements were important in explaining
the slower growth of the Periphery than of the Core, volatility in raw materials’ prices was more
important than the secular terms of trade. See “The Impact of the Terms of Trade on Economic
Development in the Periphery, 1870-1939,” NBER Working Paper no. 10600 (June, 2005).
Yet as Latin America began exporting industrial goods, the terms-of-trade argument became less
and less significant. By 2004, over 80% of the exports by value of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and
Chile were industrial goods. See World Bank, 2004 World Development Indicators (Washington,
D.C.: World Bank, 2004), 200-205.
82 Of the many studies coauthored by Williamson in this connection, among the most notable are
Michael A. Clemens and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Why did tariff-growth correlation reverse after
1950?,” NBER Working Paper 9181 (September 2002); and John H. Coatsworth and Williamson,
“Always protectionist? Latin American Tariffs from Independence to Great Depression,” Journal of
Latin American Studies 36 (2004), pp. 205- 232. The Core-Periphery scheme is used by several
other distinguished economists in Michael D. Bordo, Alan M. Taylor, and Williamson, eds.,
Globalization in Historical Perspective, (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 2003).Structuralism declined when its chief policy recommendation—industrializa-
tion— seemed to founder. In the crisis, Structuralism metamorphosed into
Dependency, and gained new adherents in Latin America and beyond.
Dependency, however, offered no consistent and practical program for
development, and at the policy level it was only influential in Allendee’s
Chile (1970-1973).
Given the transformation of the world economy after the collapse of the
Soviet empire, the Center-Periphery framework of Structuralism was
increasingly ignored by both political leaders and professional economists in
Latin America. Struggling to remain relevant, CEPAL abandoned its Center-
Periphery analysis to focus on the relationship between equity and growth.
Contemporaneously, Paul Romer and others advanced a theory of growth
that included technology as an explanatory variable. This achievement
opened the way to incorporate economic geography into “standard” neo-
classical economics, and potentially legitimized a Center-Periphery frame-
work within that subdiscipline. The Center-Periphery perspective is increas-
ingly employed in econometric history to study world trade and the process
of globalization, past and present.
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